This Note approaches the retroactivity question from a perspective that has been neglected by the courts and by other commentators. 10 It argues that, in answering this question, the Court should consider the divisive climate in which the Civil Rights Act was passed. The debate over the Act exemplifies the barriers that minority groups can generally expect to confront in protecting their interests through the legislative process. During the legislative battle, dialogue in Congress and in the press was dominated by the question of "quotas." This inflammatory rhetoric polarized the electorate, largely along racial lines, causing many voters to perceive the Act in "us-versus-them" terms.
In any analysis, courts must take into account the distorting impact of racial prejudice." With respect to the interpretation of antidiscrimination statutes, courts should consider the difficulty that racial minorities are likely to encounter when attempting to correct judicial interpretations that work to their disadvantage.' 2 An interpretation of a statute that harms the majority group may be remedied through subsequent legislative action. By contrast, an interpretation that works to the disadvantage of "discrete and insular minorities" will be comparatively difficult to undo through the same legislative process. Where doubt exists as to the best interpretation of a statute, courts should resolve these doubts to the benefit of racial minorities.
Part I puts forward a process-based theory of statutory interpretation, I1. My conception of the appropriate role of the judiciary in interpreting and applying antidiscrimination statutes borrows from the work of John Hart Ely, who advocates a process-based theory ofjudicial review. See generally JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST (1980) . As discussed infra Part I.A., Ely's analysis provides a comprehensive elaboration of the theory of heightened scrutiny first suggested in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938) . My analysis also borrows from the work of Dean Guido Calabresi. See GuIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) . Calabresi argues that courts should have the power to revise statutes that no longer fit the "legal topography"-that is, statutes that have become obsolete, but have not been revised by the legislature. Among the factors that courts should consider in determining whether to revise statutes are "asymmetries in inertia"--the greater difficulty that some groups will have in obtaining legislative reconsideration of a judicial decision. Id. at 124-29. As a general rule, Calabresi recommends "putting the burden of inertia on the side that can more easily obtain majoritarian reconsideration of the allocation. " 645 (1991) (suggesting that courts should consider barriers confronted by relatively powerless groups when interpreting statutes). This Note subscribes to Stempel's position that "enacting civil rights legislation is, even more than with most reformist legislation, an uphill fight" and that the courts should "take this reality into account before assuming that Congress can correct any judicial misreading of the law." Id. at 669, 671.
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arguing that in cases where a statute is ambiguous on its face, the legislative history is inconclusive, and minorities are likely to encounter barriers to full participation in the legislative process, courts should resolve ambiguities in favor of those minorities. Part II details the "us-versus-them" atmosphere in which the Act was discussed, exposing the prominent role of prejudice in congressional and public debates. Because it is precisely under such conditions that the minority groups are often powerless, Part III argues that the ambiguity over the Act's retroactivity should be resolved so as to compensate for the distorting effect of prejudice on the legislative process.
Existing theories of statutory interpretation fail to resolve ambiguities in statutes governing highly polarized questions like employment discrimination. Fairness requires that courts take into account the climate in which the legislation was passed, as well as the obstacles that minority groups can generally expect to face in overcoming racial prejudice.' 3 Courts should compensate for disadvantages in bargaining power by construing ambiguous provisions of antidiscrimination statutes in the light most favorable to racial minority groups. Under this analysis, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be applied retroactively.
I. A PROCESS-BASED THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Scholars have long recognized the importance of protecting the rights of minorities through constitutional adjudication. In the interpretation of antidiscrimination statutes, it is equally critical that courts consider the difficulties that racial minority groups experience in protecting themselves through the legislative process. Existing canons of statutory interpretation prove inadequate to resolve ambiguities in civil rights statutes that concern the rights of racial minorities.' 4 Courts should interpret statutory provisions to the advantage of racial minority groups where: (1) the statute is ambiguous on its face; (2) the legislative history is inconclusive or contradictory; and (3) the 13 . Though I believe that the argument advanced here could be extended to other groups, this Note focuses on racial minorities. A particularly interesting question is the extent to which the arguments advanced here are applicable to women. Although the Act concerned employment rights of both women and minorities, the legislative battle and public debate focused on the question of racial quotas. As argued infra Part II, the tenor of this debate influenced the legislative process and impeded the ability of minorities to advance their legislative interests. Despite the fact that the Act strengthened protections against sex discrimination as well as race discrimination, the public (at least until the final stages of the process) was polarized along racial lines, perceiving the Act in "us-versus-them" terms. Attention to racial quotas fueled the public perception that the Act pitted the interests of the white majority against the interests of racial minority groups. For these reasons, this Note focuses almost exclusively on the burdens racial minorities confront in reserving adverse Supreme Court decisions.
14. For an entertaining review of traditional canons of statutory interpretation, see John Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1373 REV. (1992 . Justice Stevens analyzes the authorship of Shakespeare's plays through five canons of interpretation: (1) read the statutory provision in question; (2) read the statute as a whole; (3) consider the contemporary legal context; (4) consult the legislative history; and (5) use common sense to avoid absurd results.
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A. Process-Based Theories of Judicial Review
Process-based theories of judicial review are helpful in understanding the mode of analysis that courts should adopt when interpreting ambiguous antidiscrimination statutes. In Democracy and Distrust, John Hart Ely argues that prejudice directed at minority groups obstructs their ability to participate fully in the democratic process.'
5 Ely builds upon Carolene Products' famous footnote 4 which suggests that more stringent standards of review may be appropriate in evaluating the constitutionality of statutes that reflect prejudice against "discrete and insular minorities."' 6 According to Ely, the discreteness and insularity of minority groups-the fact that they are "marked" and readily identifiable as minorities-is likely to engender hostility against them. For this reason, heightened scrutiny is necessary in assessing the constitutionality of measures that disadvantage such groups. There is no corresponding need for heightened scrutiny, however, where a rule works to the disadvantage of the majority group. As Ely puts it:
There is no danger that the coalition that makes up the white majority in our society is going to deny to whites generally their right to equal concern and respect. Whites are not going to discriminate against all whites for reasons of racial prejudice .... Whether or not it is more blessed to give than to receive, it is surely less suspicious.
7
While there is a risk of majorities acting in ways that harm racial minorities based on prejudice or animosity, there is no parallel risk that a majority will harm itself as a group." 8 The majority is in a position to protect its own interests through the political process. Racial minorities, by contrast, may have a difficult time in doing so. For this reason, courts should pay special attention to racial classifications that work against minority groups. 184, 191-92 (1964) . The discreteness and insularity of racial minorities may preclude their full participation in the pluralistic "wheeling and dealing" through which groups typically protect their interests. ELY, supra note 11, at 151. Heightened scrutiny reflects the Court's concern for groups that are at a relative disadvantage in their ability to influence the legislative process. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (referring to aliens as "prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate") (citation omitted).
B. The Implications for Statutory Interpretation
At the end of his book, Ely asserts that "constitutional law appropriately exists for those situations where representative government cannot be trusted, not those where we know it can."' 9 Ely's insight-that courts should ensure the protection of minority groups in the area of constitutional law-may be applied fruitfully to the interpretation of antidiscrimination statutes. Precisely because questions of race discrimination and "quotas" touch a raw nerve among the American public, 2 " it is vital that courts compensate for deficiencies in the legislative process when interpreting statutes.
According to Ely, statutory rules that disadvantage white majorities are not inherently suspicious, since such majorities can adequately protect their interests through representative government. By the same token, a white majority would presumably be in a better position than minorities to obtain legislative reconsideration of statutory interpretations that work to its disadvantage. It is likely to be much more difficult for racial minorities to reverse a court's interpretation of a statute through subsequent legislative action. To borrow Calabresi's phrase, the burden of legislative inertia-the difficulty with which judicial determinations may be reversed-is greater for minority groups than for the majority group.
2 ' When interpreting ambiguous antidiscrimination statutes, courts should compensate for these unequal burdens by giving minority interests the benefit of the doubt.
Precedent for the Theory: Weber and Runyon
Although the Court has never explicitly embraced this theory of statutory interpretation, the approach suggested here is not entirely unprecedented. During the 1970's, the Court adopted interpretations of two ambiguous antidiscrimination statutes that worked to the benefit of racial minorities over the vigorous protests of dissenting Justices who claimed that the majority had misconstrued congressional intent." Section 1981, passed in the wake of the Civil War, gives all persons the right to make and enforce contracts. 27 the Court held that Title VII did not prohibit affirmative action programs voluntarily adopted by employers. As in Runyon, the Court interpreted an ambiguous statute to the benefit of minority groups. 28 Although Title VII prohibits discrimination "against any individual because of his race," ' 29 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, found the affirmative action plan in question to be acceptable.°a nd Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 32. Id. at 208 (concluding that purposes of affirmative action plan "mirror those of the statute," namely "to break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy"). [Vol. 103: 567 other means by which to resolve ambiguity in antidiscrimination statutes.
Where a statute's language and history are unclear, courts should consider the problems that minority groups will experience in reversing judicial interpretations contrary to their interests. 37 Such a process-based theory of statutory interpretation supports the results reached, though not the reasoning employed, in Runyon and Weber. Decisions that disadvantage racial minorities would be very difficult to remedy through subsequent legislation. Had either Runyon or Weber been decided the other way-contrary to the interests of minority groups-it is unlikely that these determinations would have been reversed. The burden of inertia would simply be too high for a relatively powerless group to overcome.
On the other hand, the majority is in a stronger position to remedy a judicial decision that disadvantages it, because it may more easily obtain subsequent legislative reconsideration of the decision. The majority can presumably protect itself-at least better than minority groups can. If members of the white majority are unduly burdened by affirmative action programs, the legislature can respond by revising or reversing the court's interpretation.
Of course, decisions that run counter to the interests of the majority will not always be reversed by Congress. In the private affirmative action cases, for example, it would be naive to assume that minority groups have no power to block legislation detrimental to their interests. If a court misreads a statute in a way that benefits minorities, these groups would surely attempt to prevent 37. The discussion in the text assumes that honest interpretation requires fidelity to the legislature's intent where that intent has been clearly expressed. See CALABRESI, supra note 11, at 35 (stating that "legislative intent or language" is the "core of honest interpretation"); REED DICKERSON, THE Eskridge believes that courts should give effect to contemporary values in interpreting statutes. Like Calabresi, he favors a dynamic approach to the application of statutes that allows courts to update statutes that are out of phase with the contemporary legal and social landscape. But unlike Calabresi, he is comfortable referring to this approach to statutes as a form of interpretation. For a similar view, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20 (1988). Aleinikoff criticizes "archeological" conceptions of statutory interpretation, in which the statute's meaning is set in stone, and advocates a "nautical" view of statutory interpretation, which conceptualizes the development of a statute's meaning as an ongoing process or "voyage."
Calabresi, Eskridge, and Aleinikoff share the view that courts must sometimes go beyond the actual intent of the enacting legislature and take into account current social or legal norms. For an opposing view, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60 (1984) (asserting that judges are merely agents of the political branches "carryfing] out decisions they do not make"); see also Farber, supra note 28. Farber takes a middle-of-theroad position, arguing that clear statutory directives should preclude judicial policymaking, while counseling against "blind adherence" to statutory language. ld. at 282.
This Note tentatively accepts the conclusion that in the interpretation of statutes, courts are bound by clear expressions of legislative intent. But see infra note 38. Where the legislature's intent is unclear and courts must go beyond the language of the statute, reliance upon the "legal topography" or upon "social norms," however, is inadequate. Rather, courts should attempt to correct for inequities in the legislative process by interpreting statutes to the benefit of relatively powerless groups.
reversal of the court's decision. Nonetheless, the burden of inertia would be greater when the court's decision disadvantages a minority group than when it disadvantages the white majority. Given the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of § 1981 and Title VII, the Court acted correctly in adopting the interpretations that protected minority group members. 38
Process-Based Theory and Stare Decisis: Patterson and Johnson
A related question concerns the circumstances under which legislative inaction can be construed as approval of a court's interpretation. 39 The same factors that counsel against interpreting a statute to the disadvantage of a racial minority also counsel against overturning an interpretation that benefits racial minorities. Under a process-based theory of judicial interpretation, decisions that work against minority groups are entitled to less precedential weight than decisions that disadvantage members of the majority group in deciding whether to apply stare decisis.
Here again, the Court's interpretations of § 1981 and Title VII are instructive. The interpretation of § 1981 advanced by the majority in Runyon was upheld in subsequent decisions, though the Court considered overruling Runyon in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union. 40 Patterson reaffirmed that § 1981 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in the making and enforcement of private contracts. The majority applied stare decisis, finding "no special justification" for overruling Runyon. 4 
t
The Court's decisions upholding Weber are also consistent with the view that courts should be more willing to adhere to precedents that benefit minorities. The Court has consistently upheld Weber's interpretation of Title 38. Even where a statute's language and intent are clear, it may be appropriate for courts to revise antidiscrimination statutes that have become obsolete, such that they fail to provide adequate protection to members of minority groups. Both Weber and Runyon can be understood as examples of judicial revision, inasmuch as the Court silently updated statutes while ostensibly discerning legislative intent. Even if one, believes that § 1981 and Title VII are not ambiguous-that Congress did not intend § 1981 to reach private acts of discrimination and that Congress did intend Title VII to prohibit voluntary affirmative action programs-the decisions in these cases may still be supportable as instances of "judicial updating." On this reading, the lesser power of minority groups justified the Court's deviation from congressional intent.
This idea builds upon Calabresi's notion that courts should be empowered to update statutes that have become outdated, but have not been revised by the legislature. See generally CALABRESI, supra note II. The same factors that caution against interpretations of ambiguous antidiscrimination statutes that disadvantage minority groups are relevant to determining whether and when courts should update civil rights statutes. If a statute becomes out of phase and fails to provide adequate protections to minority groups, there is no reason to presume that the statute will be revised by the legislature. Under some circumstances, it may be appropriate for courts to set a new starting point by openly revising such statutes.
39. For an extended discussion of the debate over the meaning that should be attributed to the legislature's failure to take action, see William N. Eskridge 4 Justice Brennan found "some probative value" in Congress' failure to act in response to the Weber holding. 45 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia disagreed, emphasizing that checks on legislation "create[] an inertia that makes it impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act" represents approval of the Court's action. In his view, the Court "should admit that vindication by congressional inaction is a canard. 4 6 Scalia would give no weight to congressional inaction in response to the Court's rulings.
While Scalia's insight may be true as a general matter, he fails to recognize that the majority faces a much lighter burden in attempting to reverse interpretations that work to its disadvantage. Neither Johnson nor Patterson considers the crucial fact that the parties that benefitted by Runyon and Weber were members of racial minority groups. Given that the majority group is better able to effect reversal of statutory interpretations that work to its disadvantage, Congress' silence or inaction in response to Weber and Runyon may properly be seen as a persuasive factor favoring application of stare decisis.
C. Objections to Process-Based Theories
The argument that ambiguous statutes should be interpreted to the advantage of racial minorities relies on an assumption that discrete and insular minorities will have difficulty passing legislation that benefits them and blocking legislation that works against their interests. But there is reason to believe that, at least under some circumstances, racial minorities are not as powerless as this Note has to this point supposed. 47 If a court revises a statutory rule to benefit or protect minorities, then those groups are certain to fight any legislative attempts at change. The preceding discussion, one might argue, underestimates the clout of racial minority groups.
The view that racial minorities are not, in fact, disadvantaged in the legislative process bears serious consideration. As Bruce Ackerman argues, discreteness and insularity may actually work to the advantage of groups attempting to advance their interests through the legislative process. 48 Insularity may "help breed sentiments of group solidarity. '49 Being discrete allows members to "mark out" and identify one another in ways that other groups-homosexuals for instance-cannot. Both these characteristics confer benefits on those attempting to represent their interests in a pluralistic democracy." All other things being equal, discrete and insular minorities may be a powerful force in legislative bargaining.
But all things are not necessarily equal. The protection of discrete and insular minorities through the process of judicial review cannot be understood without examining the role that prejudice plays in impeding the operations of normal democratic processes. 2 While recognizing that prejudice may in some ways work to the disadvantage of racial minorities, Ackerman argues that it cannot bear the weight that it must bear in the process-based theory of judicial review expounded by Ely. This theory depends upon legislators and their constituents perceiving issues in "us-versus-them" terms. Ackerman denies that this view of human psychology is persuasive. While congressional representatives may sometimes engage in "all-out appeal[s] to prejudice," they are more likely to seek alliances with groups who are not their "natural allies." 53 Although this critique is directed towards the Carolene Products theory of judicial review, it may also be applied to a theory of statutory interpretation that takes into account the supposed defects in the legislative process. If blacks, for instance, are on the whole advantaged by their status as a "discrete (1956) . Dahl argues that "on matters of specific policy the majority rarely rules." Id. at 124. Racial minority groups, long excluded from the normal political arena, may "nevertheless often gain entry" as they form a larger part of the electorate and the "normal opportunities of the system become open to them and further protections of the franchise can then depend more and more upon the use of checkpoints in the normal system." Id. at 138.
51. Ackerman, supra note 48, at 723-24; see also Eskridge, supra note 39, at 107 (arguing that failure of Congress to revise Weber is not surprising in view of relative strength of groups favoring Court's decision).
52. Ackerman, supra note 48, at 731. 53. Id. at 734 n.39.
[Vol. 103: 567 and insular minority," then it seems inappropriate to adopt an interpretive bias that works to their benefit. Indeed, it might make sense to adopt a contrary presumption and interpret statutes so that they work to the disadvantage of minority groups. 5 4 As Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey point out in their response to Ackerman's article, his views do not "match political reality. 55 Ackerman is correct to emphasize the heavy weight that prejudice must carry in Carolene Products theories. He is wrong, however, to believe that prejudice cannot meet this burden. Minority groups do have some clout. But at least on the national level, "the clout is subordinate to that of the business community unless minorities succeed in persuading a large number of whites and decisionmaking elites of the correctness of their cause.
5 6 Particularly when hot-button issues like job discrimination and affirmative action are at issue, the public is very likely to be divided along racial lines.
Ely's commentary on constitutional law applies equally to considerations of statutory interpretation. Just as the constitutionality of distributions cannot 
II. THE DEBATE OVER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
A careful examination of the climate in which the Civil Rights Acts of 1990 and 1991 were debated reveals how prejudice can distort the legislative process. On the surface, the passage of the 1991 Act seems to cut against the general view espoused in Part I. After all, minority groups ultimately reversed the Supreme Court's adverse decisions. Judged from this standpoint, the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 lends support to the position that discrete and insular minorities, and particularly African Americans, command enormous power in the legislative process.
While this view may have superficial appeal, it completely ignores the climate in which the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was passed. The debate 54. Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), suggests just such an inversion of the Carolene Products presumption. In arguing that an affirmative action program benefitting women should be overturned, Scalia contends that the Court, in upholding Weber, has done a disservice to those with the least ability to protect themselves through the legislative process: "The irony is that these individuals [the men disfavored by the affirmative action program]-predominantly unknown, unaffluent, unorganized-suffer this injustice at the hands of a Court fond of thinking itself the champion of the politically impotent." Id. at 677; see also 
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The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 103: 567 surrounding both the 1990 and 1991 Acts exemplifies the "us-versus-them" atmosphere in which the power of minority groups is at its lowest ebb." The fact that this legislation was enacted does not necessarily mean that its provisions are adequate to protect minorities from employment discrimination. The 1991 Act represents the only comprehensive legislative revision of employment discrimination laws since the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Given the difficulties that minorities face in getting such legislation passed, ambiguities in the 1991 Act, including the question of retroactivity, should be resolved to their benefit. The rhetorical strategies employed by both proponents and opponents of the bill shed light on the uphill battle that minorities can generally expect to face in reversing Supreme Court determinations adverse to their interests. Even though neither the 1990 nor the 1991 Act contained provisions requiring employment quotas, the debate surrounding both bills centered on the quota issue. 6 ' As originally proposed, the 1990 Act aimed to overturn, at least in part, nine recent Supreme Court decisions unfavorable to civil rights plaintiffs.
6 ' But from the beginning, conservative opponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 attempted to portray the bill as one that would require employers to hire a certain number of minorities or women. This characterization reflected a strategic decision. As one conservative stated: "If the issue is drawn as quotas, we win .... If the issue is drawn as civil rights, we lose." ' 62 And the strategy appeared to work. In May 1990, Attorney General Richard Thornburgh advised President Bush to veto the Act, arguing that it would introduce "surreptitious quotas., 63 Senator John Danforth, the bill's principal Republican sponsor, vigorously denied this interpretation, asserting that "quotas will not be the unintended result of this bill." 64 The debate over the 1990 Act also exposed white voters deep-seated resentment against affirmative action programs. Polls showed that voters were divided along racial lines on issues of employment discrimination, racial quotas, and government assistance for blacks. 65 At least one Democratic strategist believed it was "in the best interests of the Democrats to have Bush sign this bill" in order to prevent the Republicans from "playing the race card., 66 Although the bill was revised in order to defuse the quota issue, President Bush maintained that its offending provisions had not been repaired 67 and he vetoed it on October 22, 1990. The attempt to override the President's veto failed by one vote in the Senate. 68 Meanwhile, Republican candidates were parlaying their opposition to the 1990 Civil Rights Act into electoral success. At the beginning of a campaign trip on behalf of Republican candidates, President Bush asserted that the vetoed 1990 Act would have resulted in quotas. 69 In North Carolina, Senator Jesse Helms won a tight race against Democratic challenger Harvey Gantt, an African American. Though behind in the polls until the final days, Helms turned the race around through the use of intensely negative advertising, accusing Gantt of supporting racial quotas. 70 showed white hands crumpling up a job rejection letter. The narrator's voice spoke: "You needed that job and you were the best qualified, but they had to give it to a minority because of a racial quota. Is that really fair?" 71 In Louisiana, Republican gubernatorial candidate David Duke, a former member of the Ku Klux Klan, who based his campaign in large part on opposition to affirmative action, won forty-four percent of the vote. Running against the Act was not a purely Southern phenomenon. In California, Senator Pete Wilson, who had voted against the Act, used the quota issue in his successful gubernatorial campaign against Diane Feinstein. 72 Against this highly polarized backdrop, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was introduced in the House on January 3, 1991.
7 ' Republicans believed the issue of race, brought to the fore by the Act, "offer[ed] the potential of polarizing the electorate along lines favorable to the GOP." 74 Democratic pollster Stanley Greenberg agreed, seeing the issue as "not only explosive" but "dangerous" for Democrats. 75 A study commissioned by the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights revealed that "many white voters believe [d] there [was] pervasive reverse discrimination in the workplace. 76 Democrats immediately attempted to broaden the appeal of the bill by characterizing it as a measure designed to protect the rights of women in the workplace. In an interesting attempt to turn the Bush Administration's strategy on its head, Representative Jack Brooks of Texas, one of the bill's sponsors, also played the race card, stating: "We need to extend to white women the right to protect themselves in the workplace, just as black women have had that right for years.
7 7 Playing upon "us-versus-them" sentiment among white voters, Brooks' remark suggests that the Act would actually put an end to reverse discrimination against white women. The attempt to frame the bill as a women's rights issue continued in the House Education Committee, which voted to rename the "Civil Rights Act of 1991" the "Civil Rights and Women's Equality in Employment Act of 1991. " 78 Opponents of the bill were quick to charge that the legislation, like the 1990 Act, would necessitate racial quotas. 79 Proponents denied that the bill would have any such effects. 0 Although there seemed to be general agreement that a contentious and divisive atmosphere existed, each side claimed that the other was responsible."' Senator Bill Bradley compared the Bush Administration's rhetoric to its use of Willie Horton during the 1988 campaign, arguing that Bush was "using race to get votes in a divisive way.'" Likewise, House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt accused President Bush of "attempting to exploit working people's fear of losing their jobs in order to justify pitting white working people against black working people." 8 3
On the other side, the conservative National Congressional Club ran commercials accusing Senator Kennedy and other liberals of trying to "require that hiring decisions be based on race." ' In June 1991, President Bush blasted supporters of the Act as "Beltway-interest groups" and denounced the "quota bill" that Democrats had proposed. 5 . Forman criticizes the civil rights lobby for denying that the Act would produce quotas, arguing that the strategy followed "undermined the vision underlying the legislative proposals." Id. at 170. My analysis, on the other hand, suggests that the polarized climate created by the "quota" charge left proponents with little choice. Portraying the Act as a measure that would benefit all Americans, rather than one that would benefit racial minorities at the expense of white workers, was essential to securing its passage.
81. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S2136, S2137 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Simpson) (stating that 1990 debate had become "a highly charged exercise in partisan politics" that left him "quite disappointed and even a bit disgusted"); 137 CONG. REC. H2474 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Hoyer) (claiming that the Bush Administration, by raising the "specter of quotas," had begun a "selfserving, deceitful, and contemptible effort to, once again, use racial fears in our country for political ends").
82 86 An equally fierce battle emerged within the media. Dick Williams of the Atlanta Journal and Constitution sided with Bush's view that the 1991 Act stressed the "politics of division" and would effectively legalize racial quotas. 87 Jim Fain of the same paper argued that Republicans were employing racist rhetoric in an attempt to attract the votes of middle-class whites. 88 A New York Times editorial chastised Bush and other Republicans for their continuing insistence that the Act would promote racial quotas, stating there was "no more incendiary epithet in present public discourse." 8 9 Although the bill adopted by House Democrats explicitly prohibited racebased quotas, 90 the Administration's strategy appeared to be working. David Gergen remarked that Bush's rhetoric was aimed to exploit the "drift of white voters away from the Democratic Party, particularly white males, and this bill is in part being used as a way to lock those people in." 9 ' The cry of quotas, according to Gergen, played upon the "backlash in this country among whites."
92
Polls validated Gergen's assertion of a backlash, particularly with respect to white males. An ABC News/Washington Post poll revealed that eighty-eight percent of whites opposed minority preferences to redress past wrongs. 93 A nationwide poll conducted by the Los Angeles Times found "deep disagreements" between black and white Americans over the question of antidiscrimination laws. 94 Sixty percent of whites believed that "blacks had an equal or better chance than whites to get good jobs and education." 95 By contrast, sixty-seven percent of black Americans believed that they had fewer opportunities than white Americans. 96 The Los Angeles Times poll concluded that white opposition to affirmative action policies that "gave minorities 92. MacNeillLehrer News Hour, supra note 71; see also Larry Tye, Quota Issue Sizzles, Touches Nerve, BOSTON GLOBE, June 9, 1991, at 1, 16 (citing interviews indicating that "the Bush Administration's framing of civil rights and hiring issues in terms of racial quotas has touched a nerve and aroused American fears in a way few other issues can").
93 [Vol. 103: 567 preference in employment" was hardening. 97 Kerry Scanlon of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund noted that, in view of this divisive atmosphere, many Southern Democrats were "scared to death" of being forced to take a stand on civil rights in an election year. 98 In June 1991, the House passed the Civil Rights Act by a substantial margin, though not enough to sustain a presidential veto. 99 White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater reiterated the President's intention to veto the Act: "The [P]resident said that if you don't like it being called a quota bill, change the bill."'" In the fall, however, the tide began to turn. The Clarence Thomas/Anita Hill hearings focused attention on sexual harassment. Senator Paul Simon remarked that during the vote on the Thomas nomination a Republican Senator said to him, "This will pass the civil rights bill."' 0 ' Judy Mann of the Washington Post argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 gave the Senate the "opportunity to put their votes where their mouths were" by demonstrating their opposition to sexual harassment.1 0 2
Pressured into taking a stand on sexual harassment, Republican Senators approached President Bush in October to forge a compromise. Recasting the debate in terms of sexual harassment rather than racial justice, Congress and the President moved closer to an agreement.' 0 3 Senator Tim Wirth remarked that the President's change of heart was largely due to the backlash from the Thomas hearings.'0 4 In late October, Bush agreed to a compromise bill, negotiated among Republican Senators, and on November 21, 1991, the President signed the Civil Rights Act. 
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I. MAKING SENSE OF THE PRODUCT: THE RETROACTmTY QUESTION
The racially divisive atmosphere that produced the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides a potent example of the continuing relevance of the Carolene Products presumptions. Throughout the battle over the Act and the 1992 presidential campaign that followed, the issue of civil rights was portrayed by many politicians and understood by many Americans in "us-versus-them" terms.'
5 Only when attention was diverted from the question of race toward the question of sexual harassment was a compromise successfully forged. In fact, the retroactivity issue appears to have been left intentionally ambiguous because of congressional reluctance to fight this battle along racial lines. It is critical then for the Court to consider the racial animus that infected the legislative process when assessing the retroactivity question.
A. Traditional Sources of Interpretation
Section 402(a) of the 1991 Act states: "Except as otherwise specifically provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon enactment."' 0 6 Two provisions specifically state that the Act is not to be applied retroactively to particular classes of cases. First, section 402(b) states: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, nothing in this Act shall apply to any disparate impact case for which a complaint was filed before March 1, 1975, and for which an initial decision was rendered after October 30, 1983. " 07 Its sole effect is to prevent the Act's provisions overruling the holding in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio' 0 8 from being applied to that specific case. 0 9 Second, the Act specifically provides that section 109, which extends the protections of Title VII to American citizens working for American companies overseas, should only apply prospectively: "The Amendments made by this section shall not apply with respect to conduct occurring before the date of the enactment of this Act."" 0 The Act does not explicitly state whether or not it should otherwise apply to conduct occurring before or to cases pending as of the date of its enactment. Bradley was a school desegregation suit brought by African-American parents and guardians in Richmond, Virginia. During the course of litigation, the school board conceded that the desegregation plan under which it had been operating was unconstitutional. Subsequent to this admission, Congress enacted section 718 of the Education Amendments of 1972,11 granting courts the authority to award attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs upon entry of a final order. The Court held that section 718 could be applied to attorney's services that were rendered before the provision was enacted, stating: "We anchor our holding in this case on the principle that a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary."" 16
The Bradley Court went on to qualify this statement by setting out three factors that might suggest that a "manifest injustice" would be done by applying the statute in question retroactively. First, courts should consider the nature and identity of the parties. Retroactivity should not be presumed in matters of merely private concern. " 7 Second, courts should consider the I 11. For a list of decisions by courts of appeals, see supra note 8. It is in the general true that the province of an appellate court is only to inquire whether a judgment when rendered was erroneous or not. But if, subsequent to the judgment, and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied. Id. at 110, quoted (with spelling and punctuation changes) in 416 U.S. at 711-12.
117. 416 U.S. at 717-19. The Court cited Chief Justice Marshall's declaration in The Schooner Peggy that courts should decide matters involving "great national concems" according to existing laws. 416 U.S. at 719 (quoting 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 110). This statement suggests that not merely the identity of the the President's rejection of the 1990 Act's retroactivity provision, in conjunction with the subsequent deletion of this provision from the 1991 Act, to be meaningful. The court interpreted the deletion of this provision to indicate that the legislators supporting retroactivity had implicitly acknowledged that the Act would only apply prospectively. In the court's view, the legislative history conclusively prohibited retroactive application under either the Bradley or Bowen presumptions.
137 "[A]ny other conclusion," the court stated, "simply ignores the realities of the legislative process."' 38 But as the Second Circuit has pointed out, the Fray court ignored Congress' rejection of the Bush Administration's attempts to introduce language that would have made the Act prospective only. 39 In Fray, the court is equally guilty of ignoring "the realities of the legislative process."
Finding the legislative history and statutory language unhelpful, most appellate courts have struggled to come to grips with the Bradley/Bowen dilemma. While rejecting the Fray court's argument based on legislative history, the Second Circuit in Butts v. City of New York Department of Housing Preservation & Development decided against retroactivity. Citing the maxim that new rules by judges apply retroactively while new statutes apply only prospectively, 40 the court adopted Bowen's presumption against retroactivity.141 The Fifth Circuit likewise chose the Bowen presumption against retroactivity, citing its "lengthy pedigree reflecting obvious and fundamental concerns of fairness and predictability."' 4 2 The Sixth Circuit argued that Bradley should be read narrowly, and that a presumption against retroactivity should apply wherever "substantive rights and liabilities" are at issue. 4 
B. A Process-Based View of the Retroactivity Question
It is clear then that traditional methods of statutory interpretation provide little assistance in determining whether the 1991 Act should apply retroactively. The statutory language makes no clear statement and the Act's history shows that proposals to make the Act explicitly prospective and explicitly retroactive were both rejected. As the Second Circuit concluded, courts are faced with a "deliberately ambiguous" statute., Given the conflicting presumptions of the Bowen and Bradley decisions, lower courts have been left with confusing precedent to guide them. Considerations of "fairness" seem to point courts in both directions.
With the exception of Fray, none of the courts has considered the effect of the legislative process upon the Act that was eventually approved.' 52 None of the decisions, including Fray, considered the impact that the "us-versus-them" attitude pervading the debate had on the Act. Nor have the courts considered the increased difficulty that minority groups face in reversing statutory interpretations that work to their disadvantage.
These considerations militate in favor of giving retroactive application to the 1991 Act. One argument for retroactivity relies upon the asymmetrical burdens of legislative inertia, discussed in the context of Weber and Runyon. 53 As in the § 1981 and Title VII cases, the minority groups that would be disadvantaged by a determination against retroactivity would have a more difficult time correcting the Court's interpretation. As the 1990 and 1991 debates show, an "us-versus-them" attitude is likely to dominate whenever the legislature considers race-related questions. 54 By contrast, if the Court determines that the Act should be given retroactive application, employers opposed to retroactivity probably would have an easier time reversing this interpretation of the Act.
There are, however, at least two objections that might be raised to this argument. For one thing, the remarks of legislators, and particularly those of Senators Danforth and Kennedy, indicate that Congress had concluded its deliberations and was leaving the retroactivity issue for courts to decide. These remarks suggest that the Court's determination, whatever it is, is unlikely to be reversed by Congress. While this presumption may be true, it is by no means certain that Congress will not change its mind and reverse the Court. All other things being equal, the Court should err on the side of protecting the group with less power in the legislative process.
A second objection strikes closer to the heart of the process-based theory expounded in this Note. It argues that an interpretive bias in favor of the less 153. See supra Part I. 154. The failed nomination of Professor Lani Guinier to the post of Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights provides another example of the "us-versus-them" climate that commonly attends such questions. Again the term "quota" was employed with explosive results. An editorial column in the Wall Street Journal titled "Clinton's Quota Queens" stated that Professor Guinier "sets the standard for innovative radicalism" and "calls for racial quotas in judicial appointments." Clint Bolick, Clinton's Quota Queens, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1993, at A12. As Mari Matsuda has observed, the term "quota queen," like President Reagan's term "welfare queen," exploits racial stereotypes for the purpose of "substituting kneejerk prejudice for critical thought." Mari Matsuda, Washington Runs Scared from a Quality Thinker, NEWSDAY, June 8, 1993, at 95.
Conservative interest groups viewed the Guinier nomination as an opportunity to capitalize on the issues of quotas and affirmative action. Neil A. Lewis, Senate Democrats Urge Withdrawal of Rights Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1993, at Al, A17. In the face of mounting opposition, President Clinton withdrew Guinier's nomination, noting that "this battle unfortunately has already polarized our country" and that continuing to pursue her confirmation would "guarantee a bloody and divisive conflict over civil rights, based on ideas that I, as President, could not defend. [Vol. 103: 567
The Persistence of Prejudice powerful interest groups presumes that there is a "right answer"--some intention on the part of Congress that the Act be applied retroactively or prospectively. But if the legislative history clarifies anything, it is that the enacting legislature harbored no such intention. Thus, the process-based theory cannot be justified by saying that the Court should "err" on the side of protecting minority interests. In the absence of congressional intent, there can be no "right answer" and, consequently, no "error" for Congress to correct.
This objection bears a resemblance to criticisms that have been made of the Carolene ProductslEly school of judicial review. In criticizing processbased theories generally, Laurence Tribe observes that " [d] eciding what kind of participation the Constitution demands requires analysis ... of the character and importance of the interest at stake."' 5 5 As Calabresi puts it, one cannot determine what type of legislative process is constitutionally permissible "without an underlying substantive theory of rights."' 56 In the case of statutory interpretation, a process-based view, it would seem, requires that the legislative rule in question contain some discernable assignment of rights.
It is true that the text of the statute and the legislative history demonstrate no clear intention on the part of the enacting legislature. The "correct" interpretation, then, cannot be the actual intention of the enacting legislature. Under these circumstances, courts should ask what rule the legislature would have chosen in the absence of racial polarization. The test proposed here seeks to replicate the outcome that would have emerged, if not for the distorting "usversus-them" climate that characterized consideration of the Act.
157
Under this test, minority interests should be given the benefit of the doubt when the statutory language and legislative intent are ambiguous. As a result of lingering racial prejudice, minority groups are, as a general rule, disadvantaged vis-A-vis majority groups. 157. A substantive view of democracy undergirds the approach to statutory ambiguity suggested here. By construing ambiguous statutes to the benefit of the group disadvantaged by racial prejudice, the presumption in favor of minority interests attempts to replicate the outcome that would emerge from a process not infected by racial prejudice. One could conceivably argue that, rather than replicating the outcome that would have emerged in the absence of racial prejudice, courts should attempt to determine what the legislature would have done had it been forced to come to a decision. Alternatively, courts could attempt to determine what the current legislature would do if forced to make the choice. Were courts to choose either of these approaches to interpretation, they might hold that the Act should not apply retroactively. Indeed, the racial polarization evident in the debate might be taken to indicate that, were Congress forced to make a decision on retroactivity, it would satisfy the preferences of the most powerful groups. This Note rejects the view that the Court should attempt to determine what the actual legislature (either past or present) would do if forced to decide. Such an approach is not only indeterminate, but also unfair. Only by resolving ambiguity in favor of the minority interests can courts hope to correct for the corrosive effects of racial prejudice. generally expect to face in reversing judicial decisions that work to their disadvantage. Minority groups pressing for retroactivity would have been in a stronger bargaining position, relative to the employers' lobby, if not for the strong racial animosity evident during the 1990 and 1991 debates.
Under these circumstances, the Court should adopt an interpretive presumption in favor of minority interests when interpreting ambiguous provisions. The effect of this mode of analysis is to place the burden of clarity upon the majority. If Congress wishes to adopt a statutory rule that works to the disadvantage of minorities, it must do so unambiguously. In the absence of a specific statement to the contrary, courts should presume that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is to apply to all cases pending at the time of enactment. Only by adopting such an interpretive presumption may the Court compensate for the effects of racial prejudice upon the legislative process.
IV. CONCLUSION
Antidiscrimination law presents special problems to which courts must be attuned when interpreting ambiguous statutes. The relevant legal principles are likely to appear very different depending on the individual judge's perspective. For this reason, courts must consider the greater difficulty that racial minorities are likely to face in protecting themselves through the legislative process, particularly when they try to overcome restrictive judicial interpretations. Courts should be wary of adopting interpretations that disadvantage or fail to protect minorities, without a clear legislative mandate to do so.
The Civil Rights Acts of 1990 and 1991 present salient examples of the continuing relevance of the Carolene Products presumptions. When inflammatory issues like employment discrimination and affirmative action are at stake, the American public still tends to view the world in "us-versus-them" terms. The racial animus faced by minority groups will often be less visible than it was during consideration of the 1991 Act. Even where racial polarization is less conspicuous, courts should take into account the relatively greater difficulty that minority groups will generally experience in revising statutory interpretations that disadvantage them.
The uphill battle faced by proponents of the 1990 and 1991 Civil Rights Act should serve as a reminder of the persistence of racial prejudice in the legislative forum. As long as such attitudes exist, courts must take into account their distorting effect on the democratic process. Where Congress has failed to speak clearly, courts should interpret statutes to the benefit of minority groups. In light of these considerations, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be given retroactive application.
[Vol. 103: 567
